The Strait of Hormuz

The strait cannot return to its pre-war state of free-flowing shipping. He rejects Oman's proposal for an equal division of the transit routes, saying it does not address Iran's security concerns, and proposes instead that Iran manage shipping on its own side while Muscat manages part but not all of the opposite lane. Iran, he says, will consider any action to keep control, including a resumption of the war.

Describes the Omani compromise on the table: three separate lanes rather than a split of control, and an Iranian position more flexible behind the scenes than in its public statements.

”The Omanis are now suggesting three lines for the maritime traffic: one that runs through Iran’s territorial waters, an international one, and one through Omani territorial waters”The Omanis are now suggesting three lines for the maritime traffic: one that runs through Iran's territorial waters, an international one, and one through Omani territorial waters

The damage does not begin at closure. Making passage conditional on permission is enough to load costs and uncertainty onto shipping, and the danger is the precedent: if several states test the boundaries with selective enforcement, tolls or levies in international straits, outcomes are settled by bargaining power.

”Even short of a full shutdown, ‘permissioning’ and pressure can impose major costs and uncertainty”Even short of a full shutdown, 'permissioning' and pressure can impose major costs and uncertainty

Cuts against the idea of a break with the old order. Using the sea to squeeze an adversary's economy is as old as naval warfare; what is new is the scale, the container volumes and the size of the world fleet, that is, how much a blockage now costs.

”Maritime action has always been an important aspect to weigh pressure on an enemy’s economy and military – there is nothing new there, but what has changed is the scale, the volume of containers, the size of the global fleet”Maritime action has always been an important aspect to weigh pressure on an enemy's economy and military, there is nothing new there, but what has changed is the scale, the volume of containers, the size of the global fleet

A route around the strait can be built. On 1 August 2026, after a meeting in Ankara with Iraq's oil minister, he announced that a transit arrangement for the Kirkuk to Ceyhan pipeline covering a daily capacity of 750,000 barrels had been implemented, while talks on a long-term agreement continue. The deal, he says, holds a more strategic position given developments in global oil markets.

An institutional counterweight to hopes placed in alternative routes. Most of the volumes that transit the strait have no other way out of the region, and spare capacity in the Saudi and Emirati pipelines runs to about 2.6 million barrels a day against roughly 20 million that normally transits.

”Most volumes that transit the strait have no alternative means of exiting the region, although there are some pipeline alternatives that can avoid the Strait of Hormuz.”Most volumes that transit the strait have no alternative means of exiting the region, although there are some pipeline alternatives that can avoid the Strait of Hormuz.